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NOTES
traffic. This decision is eminently sound. Allowing recovery in
such an instance would create a serious administrative problem
and result in virtual abolition of the distinction between hazard-
ous and non-hazardous businesses.
The principal case can be readily distinguished from the
Reagor decision. Here the presence of the customers' motor
vehicles was invited by the employer and was vital to the con-
tinued successful operation of his business, as he was without
means to transport his product to customers. Therefore the em-
ployee was required as a part of his regular duties to work in
close proximity to motor vehicles essential to the employer's
business.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case might have
reached a contrary conclusion without fear of administrative
difficulties by viewing the employer as having made the motor
vehicles of the customers an integral part of his regular business.
Such a conclusion would be in accord with the policy of liberality
found in both the decisions and the act itself.
WILLIAM C. SANDOZ
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEES OF IN-
TERMEDIARY IN LUMBERING CASES-Suit was brought against the
insurer of the Gross and Janes Tie Company to recover compen-
sation for injuries received by the plaintiff in the course of his
employment at a tie mill owned by McAllister. The tie company
negotiated with a third party landowner for the purchase of
timber for which the landowner was to be paid twenty cents
for each tie cut. The company then engaged McAllister to move
his tractor-type tie mill onto the land and cut the ties. He was
paid the market price less twenty cents per tie retained by the
company and remitted to the landowner.1 Held, that no relation-
ship of principal and contractor existed between the company
and the employer of the plaintiff; that the company was a pur-
chaser of manufactured ties, therefore, the plaintiff was not en-
titled to recover compensation from the company under Section
6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 Grant v. Consolidated
Underwriters, 33 So. (2d) 575 (La. App. 1947).
1. Also deducted from the price paid to McAllister, but not material to
the purpose of this discussion, was twenty cents per tie which the company
retained and applied to a debt owed to the company by McAllister evidenced
by a chattel mortgage on the tie mill; and twelve to fourteen cents per tie
retained and paid to the landowner for services rendered in hauling the ties
after they were cut.
2. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, La. Act 20 of 1914, as
amended, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4396].
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A purchaser is not liable under Section 6 of the act to the
employee of his seller.3 The problem is thus presented in cases
arising under this section of determining whether the defendant
occupies the status of a principal or a purchaser. The question
has most frequently arisen in cases involving lumbering trans-
actions 4 where the owner of timber agrees to sell to a middleman
who cuts the timber and resells it to the lumber company. These
sale and resale agreements are negotiated either by this middle-
man or the lumber company. The courts have consistently held
under such circumstances that the relationship between the
lumber company and the middleman is that of vendor-vendee
and, consequently, have denied recovery to the injured employee
of the middleman.5 In these decisions the courts have seized
upon the fact that title to the timber had vested in the middle-
man prior to the time that he delivered it to the lumber company
in order to find that he was a vendor rather than a contractor.6
The same result has been reached even though the middleman
was operating under an exclusive resale agreement with the
defendantJ or the original purchase from the landowner was
3. An employee must prove the existence of the relationship of contractor
and principal between his immediate employer and the defendant to estab-
lish the defendant's liability under Section 6. See Langley v. Widow and
Heirs of MacDonald, 7 La. App. 715 (1927); Morrison v. Weber-King Mfg.
Co., 6 La. App. 388 (1927); West v. Martin Lumber Co., 7 La. App. 366 (1927);
Jones v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 190 So. 204 (La. App. 1939); Wilson
v. Roberts, 194 So. 88 (La. App. 1940); Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber Co.,
9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 1942); Brown v. City of Shreveport, 15 So.(2d) 234
(La. App. 1943).
4. Twenty-four out of a total of twenty-seven reported cases dealing with
this problem relate to lumbering transactions.
5. See, for exainple, Eaves v. Hillyer-Edwards-Fuller, Inc., 139 So. 510 (La.
App. 1932); Brasher v. Industrial Lumber Co., 165 So. 524 (La. App. 1936);
Vincent v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 593 (La. App. 1941).
6. Reed v. J. W. Jeffries Lumber Co., 9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 1942). is the
only prior cases where the middleman was found to be a vendor although
title to the timber did not vest In him before his "sale" to the lumber com-
pany. The landowner refused to sell to the middleman on credit, but agreed
to sell to the lumber company; therefore the company paid cash to the
owner and was named in the deed as purchaser of the timber. Even so, the
court found that, not the company, but the middleman had purchased from
the owner. It relied upon the following facts to reach such a conclusion; the
purchase price was charged against the account of the middleman on the
books of the company; interest and carrying charges on that amount plus
severance taxes due to the state were charged against the middleman's
account; and the middleman, himself, testified that the company had at no
time owned the timber. This case illustrates the extent to which the court
has gone to find a vendor-vendee relationship between the defendant and
the middleman. It would seem that if the decision can be justified, certainly
it cannot be extended beyond the particular facts of the case.
7. Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Company, 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1941);
Perkins v. Hillyer Deutsch Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App. 1941).
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made solely on the credit of the defendant.8 Although granting
immunity to the lumber company in these cases clearly in-
vites circumvention of Section 6,9 in only one case10 has the em-
ployee been allowed to recover.
It is believed that the court erred in the present case in con-
cluding that a vendor-vendee relationship existed between the
tie company and the middleman. This case is distinguishable
from the prior cases in that, here, there was no evidence what-
ever to sustain a finding that McAllister at any time became
owner of the timber or that it was ever intended that he should
become the owner. Obviously, McAllister could not have sold
something which he did not own to the company." Additional
support for this conclusion may be found from the fact that, ap-
9. The purpose of Section 6 Is to prevent a party who receives the actual
benefit of the services rendered by the injured employee from making him-
self immune from liability by interposing an independent contractor between
himself and the employee. Since the contractor so imposed is always insol-
vent, were it not for the protection provided by Section 6, the employee
would be totally without remedy in such cases (See Mayer, Workmen's
Compensation Law in Louisiana (1937) 35). With this In mind, the court
has often stated that it would not hesitate to look beyond the surface of a
sale and resale transaction, such as these cases involve, if the facts and
circumstances justified a conclusion that the whole arrangement was a
scheme concocted in a deliberate attempt to avoid liability. [See, for ex-
ample, Hatch v. Industrial Lumber Co., 199 So. 587 (La. App. 1941); Perkins
v. Hillyer Deutsch Edwards, Inc., 199 So. 590 (La. App. 1941); Reed v. J. W.
Jeffries Lumber Co., 9 So.(2d) 87 (La. App. 1942).] In spite of such state-
ments, a cursory reading of the opinions indicates that an employee must
present evidence sufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis
before the court will find a deliberate attempt on the part of the defendant
to avoid liability. Is this not contrary to the very spirit of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and to the often announced policy of the supreme court
to construe the provisions of the act liberally in favor of the employee?
(In Byas v. Hotel Bentley, Inc., 157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303 (1925), for example,
the supreme court said, "the court of appeal has given the statute a narrow
and technical, rather than the liberal, construction intended and contem-
plated by the lawmaker, and as expressed in numerous decisions of this
court.") It is submitted, that even in these lumbering cases where it can
be shown that technically a vendor-vendee relationship has been established,
the employee should not be denied recovery, when it is probable that such
a scheme may exist, merely because he cannot prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is attempting to avoid liability. Such decisions are
certainly invitations to unscrupulous employers to deprive the employee
of his right to compensation. If the court is without authority to remedy
this situation, then legislative action is certainly in order.
10. Carter v. Colfax Lumber and Creosoting Co., 121 So. 233 (La. App.
1928) (Middleman purchased timber from the landowner while acting as
agent for defendant lumber company. The court placed considerable weight
on the testimony of the middleman to the effect that he had been an em-
ployee of the defendant for several years and had never considered himself
anything other than an employee).
11. Art. 2452, La. Civil Code of 1870, provides: "The sale of a thing be-
longing to another person is null .... .
8. Windham v. Newport Co., 143 So. 538 (La. App. 1932); Cannon v. Tre-
mont Lumber Co., 188 So. 431 (La. App. 1939); Williams v. George, 15 So.
(2d) 823 (La. App. 1943).
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parently, the entire arrangement for the purchase of the timber
from the landowner was the result of negotiations carried on
exclusively by the company; that McAllister was neither present
at the time nor was he aware that the agreement to purchase
was contemplated until after it had been concluded; and that it
was the company to whom the landowner was to look for pay-
ment. Unfortunately, the court did not see fit to devote any por-
tion of its opinion to an explanation of how McAllister acquired
ownership. 12
It would appear that the result reached in the present case
could more easily be justified on the ground that the work which
was performed was not a part of the regular business of the
Gross and Janes Tie Company.13 Section 1, Subsection 2, of the
Workmen's Compensation Act requires that an employee must
show as a condition precedent to recovery that he was perform-
ing services "in the course of his employer's trade, business, or
occupation." This same requirement has been made a part of
Section 6 of the act.14 Since there was uncontradicted evidence
in the record to show that the tie company was not engaged in
the business of manufacturing ties, but rather its business was
confined to the purchase of manufactured ties, recovery could
have been denied on this basis.
WILTON H. WILLIAMS, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-REsPONSIVE VERDICTs-Under
a bill of information charging defendant with the crime of ag-
gravated arson, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of "simple
arson in the sum of $150." Held, simple arson is not responsive
to a charge of aggravated arson because it is not an included of-
fense, as required by Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure of 1928 as amended by Act 147 of 1942. Motion in arrest of
judgment sustained. State v. Murphy, 38 So. (2d) 254 (La. 1948).
At the time of the trial, Act 161 of 1948 amending Article
12. The court did find that the original purchase agreement was not
binding upon the tie company or the landowner and that therefore title to
the ties did not vest in the company until they were cut and delivered by
McAllister, but, as far as this writer can discover, it never did explain how
it found that McAllister became owner of the ties prior to the time he de-
livered them to the company.
13. Instead the court said, "the sole issue before us is whether, on the
basis of these facts, McAllister was in truth an employee or a contractor of
Gross and Janes Company. If the facts justify such an answer, then, un-
questionably, the defendant, as the insurance carrier of Gross and Janes,
is clearly liable for compensation." 33 So.(2d) 575, 576.
14. Horrell v. Gulf and Valley Cotton Oil Company, Inc., 131 So. 709 (La.
App. 1930); Wilson v. Roberts, 194 So. 88 (La. App. 1940).
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